Pittman v. Atlantic Realty: Affidavits and the Search for the Genuine Dispute of Material Fact by Tromley, Gwen B.
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 31
Number 1 Summer/Fall 2000 Article 3
2000
Pittman v. Atlantic Realty: Affidavits and the Search
for the Genuine Dispute of Material Fact
Gwen B. Tromley
Baltimore City Department of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tromley, Gwen B. (2000) "Pittman v. Atlantic Realty: Affidavits and the Search for the Genuine Dispute of Material Fact," University of
Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 31: No. 1, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol31/iss1/3
Articles 
PITTMAN V.ATLANTIC REALTr: AFFIDAVITS AND THE SEARCH FOR THE 
GENUINE DISPUTE OF MATERIAL FACT 
by Gwen B. Tromleyz 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Scheduling orders, the discovery process and 
summary judgment: these are among the key elements of 
Maryland's structured system of civil litigation. Generally, 
these elements operate in a sequenced fashion to propel 
cases toward resolution. However, when litigation does 
not proceed according to the intended paradigm, a case 
may reach the court-ordered summary judgment phase 
before all of the material facts have been revealed. In this 
article, I will discuss the Pittman case, Maryland 
procedure, and the sham affidavit rule of federal caselaw. 3 
I also will suggest a change in the Maryland Rules. 
In considering a motion for summary judgment, how 
should a trial court treat affidavit:s4 submitted in opposition 
I 359Md. 513, 754A.2d 1030 (2000). 
2 Ms. Trom1ey is an Assistant Solicitor in the Baltimore City 
Department of Law. The opinions expressed in this article are 
solely those of the author, and are not those of the Mayor and 
City Council of Baltimore, the Baltimore City Solicitor, or of 
the Baltimore City Department of Law. 
3 As discussed more fully below, this term is a reference to a 
rule of federal caselaw, pursuant to which a court may 
disregard an affidavit on the grounds that it is a "sham" that 
fails to raise a genuine dispute of material fact, if the affiant 
has personal knowledge of the facts but cannot explain a 
material contradiction between the party's deposition 
testimony and that party's subsequent affidavit. 359 Md. at 
529, 754 A.2d at 1038. 
4 For the purpose of this Note, I will refer to affidavits 
submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment 
that contradict prior deposition testimony, as "affidavits." 
Another commentator has termed them "offsetting affidavits." 
See Collin J. Cox, Reconsidering the Sham Affidavit 
Doctrine, 50 DUKE L. J. 261, 262 (2000). 
31.1 U. Bait L.F. 30 
to the motion that squarely contradict5 prior deposition 
testimony? May a trial court strike these affidavits when 
their factual content varies from what the nonmoving party 
previously has furnished in discovery and the deadline for 
discovery under the trial court's scheduling order has 
passed? Federal and state courts considering these issues 
have adopted a range of approaches; the Supreme Court 
has yet to consider the issue. Recently, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland addressed these questions in 
Pittman v. Atlantic Realty,6 an opinion that underscores 
the dilemma confronting trial courts and parties engaged 
in the determination of whether, for purposes of summary 
judgment, there exists a genuine dispute of material fact. 7 
In this lead paint poisoning case, Defendant, Atlantic 
Realty ("Atlantic"), had deposed three ofPlaintiffs '8 chief 
witnesses9 a full year before Atlantic moved for summary 
judgment in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. In 
opposition to the motion, Plaintiffs submitted affidavits from 
these three witnesses, asserting facts that differed 
substantially from those claimed in the affiants' prior 
deposition testimony. Plaintiffs relied on these new facts, 
enlarging the dates and length of time the minorTerran 
had visited or resided at Atlantic's property, as the basis 
upon which to present a revised and, now, favorable 
5 359Md. at527, 754A.2dat 1037. 
6 /d. at517, 754 A.2dat 1032. 
7 See Md. Rule 2-50l(a), (b) and (e). 
8 Plaintiff Shari Hall ("Hall") brought suit on behalf of herself 
and her minor son, Terran Pittman ("Terran"), who is alleged 
to have sustained lead poisoning as the result of exposure at 
Atlantic's property. 
9 These witnesses were Plaintiff Shari Hall, her mother, 
Gladys Hall, and the Plaintiffs' medical expert. 
medical expert opinion. 
After granting Atlantic's motion to strike Plaintiff's 
affidavits on the grounds that they were "sham affidavits," 
the trial court entered summary judgment for Atlantic on 
the remaining evidence before the court. 10 The Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland, adopting the federal 
sham affidavit rule, affirmed the holding of the trial 
court. 11 The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed. 12 
Declining to apply the sham affidavit rule, the court 
of appeals held that the circuit court had erred in 
striking Plaintiffs' affidavits because the act of striking 
them had required the trial court to engage improperly 
in credibility determinations. 13 The court remanded 
the case with instructions and the case is now set for 
trial in the fall of2001. 14 
At first reading, the result in this case may seem unjust. 
The three dissenting members of the court expressed the 
view that under the circumstances of this case the trial 
court had the discretion to strike the affidavits. 15 Although 
the opinion exhibits a scholarly analysis of the rules 
10 359 Md. at 524-25, 754 A.2d at I 035-36. 
II I27 Md. App. 255,732 A.2d 9I2 (I999). 
12 359 Md. at 5I7, 754 A.2d at 1032. 
13 The Court said: "The sham affidavit rule is contrary to the 
way in which this Courts rule on summary judgment 
traditionally has been applied, because, in application, the 
sham affidavit rule requires a credibility judgment by the 
trial court." Jd. at 534,754 A.2d at 1041 (emphasis added). 
14 See Case No. 24-C-94-I7304I, Pre-Trial Scheduling 
Order, October I7, 2000. 
15 Writing for the dissent, Judge Wilner described the "sham 
affidavit" rule as a "reasonable and useful approach to 
protecting both the summary judgment procedure and our case 
management system against blatant fraud. I would hold, in this 
case, that the trial court had discretion to strike the two 
affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment, that it did not abuse its discretion in so doing, and 
that, on the remaining record presented to the court for 
purposes of the motion, it did not err in granting the motion." 
359 Md. at 553, 754 A.2d at I 05I. (Wilner, J., dissenting). 
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governing discovery, summary judgment, scheduling 
orders, and the cases that interpret these rules, it also 
exposes the policy problems that exist under the Rules , 
as currently drafted. 
Should a party who has undertaken and provided 
full discovery be subjected to learning, only upon filing for 
summary judgment, that the factual basis of the opposing 
party's claim has changed in a fundamental way? Why 
should a party be expected to devote its financial and other 
resources to litigating a case in accordance with the Rules, 
only to find that the other side does not appear to be 
following the same rules? One must ask why, if the facts 
of the case are as stated in the affidavit in opposition to 
summary judgment, such facts were not disclosed during 
the court-ordered discovery phase of the litigation, in 
Plaintiffs' answers to interrogatories or in deposition, when 
the questions posed would necessarily have elicited the 
facts later asserted. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Terran Pittman was born in December 1990. 16 In 
1992, he was diagnosed as having an elevated blood lead 
level. 17 In 1994, Hall filed suit against Atlantic Realty on 
behalf of herself and her son, alleging that Terran had 
sustained injuries as a result of exposure to lead paint on 
Atlantic's property.18 In March 1995, the trial court issued 
its scheduling order, mandating that discovery in the case 
be completed by March 1996. 19 The order required the 
parties to conclude expert depositions and further 
supplementation of discovery by March 1998.20 
As discovery in the case progressed in accordance 
with the court's scheduling order, Hall answered Atlantic's 
16 !d. at 517, 754 A.2d at I032. 
17 !d. 
18 Although Hall also sued the Housing Authority of 
Baltimore City ("HABC"), that defendant has been dismissed 
from the case without prejudice.Jd. at 5I7, 754 A.2d at I 032. 
19 !d. at 518, 754 A.2d at I 032. 
20 !d. 
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interrogatories and was later deposed by Atlantic's 
counsel. In answers to interrogatories, Hall stated that 
she and Terran had moved onto Atlantic's property in 
"approximately the spring/summer of 1992."21 She 
described the period of their residence at the property as 
"1992-1993."22 Without specifying a time frame, Hall 
stated that Terran had been cared for at Atlantic's property 
from "8:00a.m. to 4:00p.m. Monday through Friday."23 
Hall's deposition testimony, concerning the length 
of Plaintiffs' residence and visits at Atlantic's property, 
was "vague, confused and inconsistent."24 Hall told 
deposing counsel that two months was the "maximum" 
period that she had lived at Atlantic's property,25 and 
that Terran had visited the property "twice a week 
before residing there and three to four times a week 
for up to three hours at a time after residing there."26 
In his deposition testimony, Plaintiffs' medical expert 
opined that a two-month exposure to lead during residence 
at Atlantic's property was not sufficient to constitute a 
"'substantial factor' in causingTerran's injuries."27 Lacking 
a time frame for Terran 's visits, the doctor could not state 
with a reasonable degree of medical probability that 
exposure to lead at Atlantic's property was a "major 
contributor" to Terran 's injuries. 28 
Subsequently, in April 1998, Atlantic moved for 
summary judgment relying on the testimony ofPlaintiffs' 




25 /d. at 520, 754 A.2d at 1033. 
26 /d. at 521, 754 A.2d at 1034. The Court summarized Hall's 
testimony in this manner, noting that the testimony would be 
viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff-Petitioners. 
27 /d. at523, 754A.2dat 1035. 
28 /d. at 522-523, 754 A.2d at 1035. 
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medical expert that he could not render an opinion 
concerning "substantial factor causation."29 In 
response, Plaintiffs filed the three affidavits that gave 
rise to the dispute in this case. Granting Atlantic's 
motion to strike the affidavits, the trial court observed, 
"'[t]he process of discovery can become subverted .. 
. if by the mere presentation of an affidavit constructed 
more than a year after the presentation of deposition 
testimony, a witness can so dramatically alter her 
evidence."30 In the absence of the stricken affidavits, 
Plaintiffs could not meet their burden of establishing 
that exposure to lead at Atlantic's property was a 
substantial factor in causing Terran's injuries.31 With 
the case in this posture, the trial court entered summary 
judgment in favor of Atlantic.32 
III. DISCUSSION 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 
describing the affidavits as creating unfair surprise, 
characterized them as containing information that 
contradicted Hall's interrogatory answers and her 
deposition testimony.33 The court further observed that 
the affidavits, lengthening the child's residence on Atlantic's 
property to five and one half years, were not filed within 
the discovery deadline.34 The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted certiorari in order to determine whether 
to adopt the sham affidavit rule of federal case law. 35 
Before the court of appeals, Plaintiffs contended that 
application of the sham affidavit rule violates Maryland 
law prohibiting trial courts from engaging in credibility 
29 /d. at 523, 754 A.2d at 1035. 
30 /d. at 525, 754 A.2d at 1036. 
31 !d. 
32 /d. at524, 754A.2dat 1036. 
33 /d. at525-26, 754A.2dat 1036-37. 
34 !d. 
35 !d. at526, 754A.2dat 1037. 
determinations on review of motions for summary 
judgment, that Ru1e 2-501 authorizes the filing of affidavits 
in opposition to summary judgment motions and that 
Plaintiffs' affidavits merely "supplement and clarify" 
their prior discovery responses. 36 Atlantic Realty 
countered that the sham affidavit rule is consistent with 
standard summary judgment procedure, that deposition 
testimony is "inherently more reliable than affidavits," 
and that the rule preserves the "integrity of scheduling 
orders."37 Because the court of appeals provided 
straightforward guidance regarding the affidavit 
practices that it will uphold in the summary judgment 
context, the impact of the court's opinion is not limited 
to parties in lead paint cases. 
The opinion highlights five issues of continuing interest 
to trial judges and litigators. First, the court reiterated the 
well-established rule that, in reviewing a motion for 
summary judgment, a court may not engage in credibility 
determinations. 38 Next, the court held that Maryland does 
not adopt the sham affidavit rule presently applied in 
most federal courts.39 Third, the court outlined the 
circumstances under which Maryland courts presently are 
authorized to disregard the otherwise admissible content 
of an affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment.40 Fourth, the court clarified that neither the rule 
governing scheduling orders41 nor the scheduling order 
itsel:f'2 deprive the non-moving party of the right to submit 
an affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary 
36 !d. 
37 !d. 
38 /d. at 534, 754 A.2d at 1041. 
39 !d. at 539, 754 A.2d at 1044. 
40 !d. 
41 See Rule 2-504. 
42 The Scheduling Order in this case required completion of all 
discovery, including supplementation, by March 1998. 
43 359 Md. at 534, 754 A.2d at I 041. 
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judgment. 43 Finally, the court offered alternative 
approaches for dealing with summary judgment affidavits 
where the factual content varies substantially from 
information furnished previously in discovery, 
observing that sanctions and other remedies are 
available against parties who submit such affidavits 
in bad faith in order to avoid the entry of summary 
judgment.44 
A. Summary Judgment 
Neither the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure, nor 
the Maryland Rules, address the issue of how a court 
should treat affidavits that contradict prior deposition 
testimony. 45 Federal Ru1e 56 authorizes the court to grant 
summary judgment, "if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter oflaw."46 Similarly, Maryland's 
summary judgment rule provides that "[t]he court shall 
enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if 
the motion and response show that there is no genuine 
dispute of material fact and that the party in whose favor 
judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law."47 
As noted by the dissent in Pittman, 48 federal practice 
44 !d. at 542-43, 754 A.2d at 1046. 
45 !d. at 527,754 A.2d at 1037. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides for the required form of affidavits, 
circumstances in which affidavits are unavailable, and 
affidavits made in bad faith. Maryland Rule 2-501 imposes 
minimum requirements for affidavits supporting or opposing a 
motion for summary judgment, including that they be made 
upon personal knowledge, set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant 
is competent to testify to the matters set forth in the affidavit. 
46 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). 
47 Rule 2-501 (e). 
48 !d. at 555,359 Md. at 555,754 A.2dat 1052-53. 
31.1 U. Bait. L.F. 33 
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and interpretation have nearly always been treated as 
persuasive because Maryland's summary judgment rule 
was derived from the Federal Rule. Nevertheless, one 
distinct difference between the state and federal rules is 
meaningful in the analysis of this case. Unlike the 
Federal Rule, Maryland's Rule does not include a 
provision authorizing a trial court to sanction a party 
who presents an affidavit in bad faith. 49 Thus, while 
the rules are substantially similar, this difference may 
have helped produce the result in this case. 
As in any negligence case, in order to establish a 
cause of action in a lead paint poisoning case, a party 
must show that: ( 1) the defendant was under a duty to 
protect the plaintiff from injruy; (2) the defendant breached 
that duty; (3) the plaintiff suffered actual loss or injury; 
and ( 4) the loss or injury proximately resulted from the 
defendant's breach of duty. 50 Moreover, to survive a 
motion for summary judgment in a lead paint case, the 
plaintiff must present evidence establishing that: ( 1) the 
landlord knew or had reason to know of a condition on 
the premises that posed an unreasonable risk of physical 
harm to persons in the premises, and (2) the landlord 
should have realized the risk oflead poisoning. 51 Further, 
49 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (g) authorizes the court to impose sanctions 
against a party who has submitted an affidavit "in bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay." Interestingly, Maryland's 
summary judgment rule, codified then as Rule 610, previously 
has included a bad faith provision. However, as noted by 
Professor Brown, the former rule did not authorize the court to 
hold the "offending party" or counsel in contempt or to order 
an "offending attorney" rather than the party, to pay the 
expenses incurred by the bad faith conduct. See Brown, 
Summary Judgment in Maryland, 38 MD. L. REV. 188, 219 
(1978), Copyright 1979 by C. Christopher Brown. All rights 
reserved. 
50 Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 670, 645 
A.2d 114 7, 1151 ( 1994), Bartholomee v. Casey, I 03 Md. App. 34, 
56-57' 651 A.2d 908, 918 ( 1994). 
51 Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 361-62, 744 A.2d 47, 57 
(2000). See also, Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding, 362 Md. 661, 
766 A.2d617 (2001). 
52 359Md.at521 n.4, 754A.2dat 1034(citingBartholomeev. 
Casey, 103 Md.App. 34,56-57,651 A.2d 908,918 (1994)). 
31.1 U. Bait L.F. 34 
the plaintiffbears the burden to prove specifically that 
a "'defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in 
causing the plaintiff's injuries."'52 Clearly, evidence 
tending to prove the amount of time that Terran had 
spent at Atlantic's property was essential to the viability 
of Plaintiffs' claim. 
In this case, when faced with the motion for summary 
judgment, Plaintiffs changed the position they advanced in 
prior discovery. 53 Without the post -deposition affidavits 
at issue in this case, Plaintiffs could not sustain their burden 
to prove that exposure on Atlantic's property was a 
"substantial factor" in causing Terran 's injuries. 54 
The rudiments of summary judgment are well settled. 
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving 
party must show that there is a genuine dispute of material 
fact by proffering facts that would be admissible in 
evidence. 55 Generalized allegations that do not show facts 
in detail and with precision are insufficient to prevent 
summary judgment. 56 The "mere existence of a scintilla of 
evidence in support of the plaintiff's claim is insufficient to 
preclude summary judgment; there must be evidence upon 
which the jruy could reasonably find for the plaintiff."57 
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the 
court does not decide matters of credibility, 58 and must 
53 Jd. at 523, 754 A.2d at 1035. 
54 !d. at 524, 754 A.2d at 1036. 
55 Beatty v. Trailmaster Products, 330 Md. 726, 73 7, 625 A.2d 
1005, 1011 (1993) (expert's affidavit did not provide admissible 
evidence creating genuine issue of material fact). 
56 !d. at 738, 625 A.2d at 1011. 
57 !d. at 738-739, 625A.2d at 1011 (citing Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,252 (1986)). 
58 359 Md. at 537, 754A.2d at 1043 (citing Frush v. Brooks. 204 
Md. 315,321, 104A.2d624, 626 (1954); Goodwich v. Sinai 
Hospital ofBaltimore, Inc., 343 Md. 185,206,680 A. 2d 1067, 
1077-78 (1996);Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242,249 
(1986)). 
59 330 Md. at 739,625 A.2d at 1011 (citingClea v. City of 
Baltimore, 312 Md. 662,678,541 A. 2d 1303, 1311 (1988)). 
resolve all reasonable inferences in favor of the party 
opposing summary judgment. 59 How, then, does a court 
determine the genuineness of an asserted factual dispute if 
it is not permitted to examine the circumstances under 
which a non-movant's affidavit is submitted? Does a trial 
court's analysis in determining the "genuineness" of 
an asserted factual dispute necessarily involve a 
credibility determination? If not, how does a court 
determine whether an asserted factual dispute is, 
indeed, "genuine" without invading the jury's province 
to determine credibility, usurping its role as factfinder? 
In construing the Maryland Rules, the court relies 
upon principles similar to those used to interpret statutes, 
looking first to the text ofthe Rule and giving its words 
their ordinary meaning.60 If the words are unambiguous, 
the inquiry ends. 61 The term "genuine" has been defmed 
as: "1. possessing the alleged or apparent attribute or 
character; 2. not spurious or counterfeit; authentic; 3 .a. 
honestly felt or experienced; b. actual; real; 4. free from 
hypocrisy or dishonesty; sincere. ''62 
Although there does not appear to be any ambiguity 
as to the meaning of the word "genuine," it is also useful to 
consider the history of the summary judgment rule, first 
adopted in 194 7 as section IV of the Law and Equity 
Rules of the General Rules of Practice and Procedure. 
Maryland Code (1939, 1947 Cum. Supp.), at 2044.63 
The Rules Committee Reporter's explanatory notes at that 
time described the purpose of the Rule: 
The court does not, of course attempt to decide 
any issue of fact or of credibility, but only whether 
such issues exist. If the affidavits or other 
60 Wilson v. NBS, Inc., 130 Md. App. 430, 746A.2d 966 (2000). 
(trial court had inherent authority, although not rule-based 
authority, to dismiss minor lead paint plaintiff's cause of action 
for failure to comply with order for examination). 
61 Id. at441, 746A.2dat971. 
62 The American Heritage College Dictionary, Third Edition, 
1997. 
63 359Md. at537, 754A.2dat 1042-43. 
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evidence show a genuine conflict, the court 
must deny the motion. Thus, the proposed 
procedure is not a substitute for a trial, but 
only a hearing to decide whether a trial is 
necessary. But the party opposing the motion 
must show by facts that there is a real 
dispute. 64 
A similar purpose is reflected in Maryland Rule l-
201(a), which provides that, "These rules shall be 
construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in 
administration, and elimination of unjustifiable expense 
and delay. 65 
With this perspective in mind, it is helpful to examine 
the method by which the court ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment determines whether there exists a 
genuine dispute of material fact. Describing the test for 
this detenninationas ''highly analogous" to whether amotion 
for judgment should be granted in a case tried to a jury, 66 
the court explained that to prevent the entry of summary 
judgment, the non-moving party must present "such 
evidence upon which the jury could reasonably find for 
the plaintiff. "67 In other words, "the evidence presented 
by the nonrnovant68 must be such as 'would allow a 
reasonable factfinder to conclude' that, in actuality, the 
64 Id. at 537,754 A.2d at 1043. 
65 MD. RULE PROC. §l-20l(a)(2000)(Emphasisadded). 
66 359 Md. at 537,754 A.2dat 1043. 
67 !d. at 537-38, 754A.2d at 1043 (citing Beatty v. Trailmaster 
Prods., Inc., 330 Md. at 739,625 A.2d at 1011-12). 
68 Maryland's summary judgment rule authorizes the court to 
enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the 
motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute of 
material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is 
entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
69 359 Md. at 538,754 A.2d at 1043 (citing Chesapeake Pub. 
Corp. v. Williams, 339 Md. 285,299,661 A.2d 1169, 1176 (1995), 
Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Richard F. Kline, Inc., 91 Md. App. 236, 
245,603 A.2d 1357, 1361 (1992)). 
31.1 U. Bait. L.F. 35 
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facts were those most favorable to the nonmovant."69 
The Sham Affidavit Rule 
In Pittman, the court of appeals' description of the 
Plaintiffs' affidavits illustrates the dilemma facing the trial 
court considering the motion for summary judgment 
and Plaintiffs' opposition: 
These affidavits were signed on May 7, 1998, 
and filed the next day in court, more than one 
year after Hall's deposition and almost two 
months past the scheduling order's deadline for 
concluding all supplementation of discovery and 
all expert discovery. Gladys Hall .. .in her 
affidavit. ... tripled or quadrupled the 'couple of 
months' to which she had testified on 
deposition. 70 
*** 
Furnished with the then stationary factual 
platform of five and one-half months residence, 
plus over three years of visiting 'on an every 
day basis' for seven to eight hours a day, Dr. 
Klein, expressly assuming the truth of the new 
affidavits, opined in his May 7 affidavit that 
exposure at the subject premises was a 
substantial causal factor in Terran's lead 
poisoning. 71 
*** 
Neither the Hall nor the Gladys Hall affidavits 
presented any explanation for the variances from 
70 359 Md. at 523, 754 A.2d at 1035. 
71 Id. at 524, 754 A.2d at 1036. 
72 !d. 
73 !d. at 527, 754 A.2d at 1037. 
31.1 U. Bait L.F. 36 
the prior evidence given by the respective 
witnesses. 72 
The Second Circuit was frrst73 to consider the issue 
of a trial court's treatment of an affidavit submitted in 
response to a motion for summary judgment in the 
case of Perma Research & Development Co. v. Singer 
Co. 74 Perma filed suit against Singer alleging that 
Singer did not intend to perform the parties' contract 
for certain product assembly services. 75 In his 
deposition, Perma's president failed to specify the facts 
evidencing Singer's alleged fraud, and even 
acknowledged that the two companies had been 
working together to resolve problems in the product until 
Singer stopped performing.76 Nevertheless, when Singer 
moved for summary judgment, Perma's president 
submitted an affidavit in opposition, claiming that one of 
Singer's agents had told him that Singer never intended to 
perform.77 
After the district court granted summary judgment, 
the Second Circuit affirmed on grounds characterized by 
the Pittman court as "the reliability, utility, and fairness 
rationales."78 The Perma court reasoned that the district 
court properly could have concluded that deposition 
testimony, having been subjected to cross-examination, 
was more reliable than an affidavit. 79 Moreover, the court 
contended, disregarding a contradictory affidavit preserved 
the utility of the summary judgment process as a device to 
74 410 F.2d 572 (2d. Cir. 1969). 
75 !d. at 574. 
76 359 Md. at 513,527, 754A.2dat 1037 (citing Perma, 410 F. 2d 
at576). 
77 !d. (citing Perma, 410 F.2d at 577). 
78 359 Md. at 529, 754 A.2d at 1038. 
79 !d. at 528, 754 A.2d at 1038. 
80 !d. 
eliminate sham claims. 80 In sum, the "Perma rule" 
stands for the proposition that a trial court may 
disregard as a sham, failing to raise an issue of material 
fact, an affidavit that contradicts a party's prior 
deposition testimony, where the party has personal 
knowledge of relevant facts and cannot explain a 
material contradiction between deposition testimony 
and a subsequent affidavit. 81 
Since the Second Circuit's opinion in Perma, state 
and federal courts have considered the sham affidavit 
issue with a variety of results. For example, in 
Rohrbaugh v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,82 the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed the district court's disregard of an 
expert's post-deposition affidavit, concluding: 
Given the conflicts between Dr. Cox's affidavit 
and his deposition testimony, the District Court 
was left not with a genuine issue of material fact 
but with trying to determine which of several 
conflicting versions ofDr. Cox's testimony was 
correct. (citations omitted). We hold that the 
District Court was justified in disregarding the 
affidavit. Without the affidavit Plaintiffs have not 
met their burden to come forward with enough 
evidence that a jury could find that Defendant's 
vaccine probably caused Plaintiff's injuries. 83 
State courts have rejected the rule more frequently 
than have federal courts.84 The Pittman opinion 
exemplifies the chief criticism ofthe Perma rule: that its 
application forces a court to assess credibility. Even the 
dissent in Pittman expressed concern "that adopting that 
approach would improperly allow the court, on summary 
81 Id. at529, 754A.2dat 1038. 
82 916 F.2d 970,976 (4th Cir. 1990). 
83 Id. 
84 See Collin J. Cox, Reconsidering the Sham Affidavit 
Doctrine, 50 DUKE L.J. 261,272-75 (2000). 
85 359 Md. at 556, 754A.2dat 1053. (Wilner, J., dissent). 
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judgment, to resolve conflicting evidence and make 
credibility assessments, which are matters for the trier of 
fact to determine. "85 When may a Maryland court, which 
is considering summary judgment, strike an opposing 
affidavit that contradicts or alters the affiant's prior 
deposition testimony? Under Pittman, if the court 
concludes that "a rational jury would reject as incredible" 
the facts set forth in the affidavit, the court is authorized to 
disregard the otherwise admissible content of the 
affidavit.86 
One legal commentator has identified three 
approaches, which he describes as "all wrong,"87 adopted 
by courts in the treatment of post-deposition affidavits 
submitted in opposition to summary judgment. 88 In the 
first approach, all inconsistencies are deemed to generate 
a fact question that should go to the jury. 89 Professor 
Duane describes this approach as consistent with the 
Supreme Court's repeated insistence that opposing 
evidence must be believed.90 The second approach, a 
theoretical and functional opposite ofthe first, advocates 
striking all contradictory affidavits on the policy grounds 
(as enunciated in Perm a) of preserving the "utility" of 
summary judgment.91 Finally, in the third or intermediate 
approach, the judge draws a distinction "between 
discrepancies which create transparent shams and 
discrepancies which create an issue of credibility or go to 
86 Id. at539, 754A.2dat 1044. 
87 See J. J. Duane, The Four Greatest Myths About Summary 
Judgment, 52WASH.&LEEL.REV 1523, 1596(1995). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 1597. 
91 Id. 
92 I d. at 1598 (citing Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 953 
(11th Cir. 1986) and, inter alia, Rohrbaugh v. Wyeth 
Laboratories, Inc. 916 F.2d 970,975 (4th Cir. 1990)). 
93 52 WASH. & LEE L.REV at 1604. 
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the weight of the evidence."92 
In Professor Duane's view, the court need not strike 
an affidavit even if it appears to be a sham.93 Rather, the 
judge should pose "one simple question": "'Assuming that 
all of the witnesses would testifY at trial just as they have in 
their most recent affidavits, that they are cross-examined 
about the allegedly inconsistent statements they made at 
their depositions and that the jury hears the same 
explanation I have been given (if any) about the variation, 
is there any genuine possibility that the jury might find 
in favor of the adverse party?"'94 He offers this 
approach as a "simple solution ... simple in 
application, coherent, and correct."95 Is Professor 
Duane's proposal the analytical equivalent of 
Maryland's test, i.e., whether the non-moving party 
has presented such evidence upon which a jury could 
reasonably find for the plaintiff? 
B. Scheduling Orders vs. Summary Judgment: 
Rules in Conflict? 
After a lead paint case is filed, the circuit court issues 
a scheduling order tailored to the proof requirements in 
such cases.96 In Pittman, the Plaintiffs had three years 
94 /d. 
95 !d. 
96 In Baltimore City, the standard scheduling order was 
developed through the sustained efforts of Judge Ellen M. 
Heller, in ongoing meetings with members of the "lead paint 
Bar," representing the views of both plaintiffs and defendants 
in these actions. The comprehensive nature of the orders is a 
testament to Judge Heller's determination to assure that the 
parties have every opportunity to prepare their cases. 
97 359 Md. at 518, 754 A.2d at 1032. The scheduling order, 
issued in March 1995, required that discovery be completed 
by March 1996, and that further supplementation and expert 
depositions be completed by March 1998. !d. 
98 !d. at533-34, 754A.2dat 1041. 
99 !d. at 526,754 A.2d at 1037. 
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from the date of the court's scheduling order to furnish 
all information responsive to the Defendants' discovery 
requests.97 Atlantic argued that Plaintiffs violated the 
scheduling order's discovery deadline by submitting a post-
discovery period affidavit that altered the facts Plaintiffs 
had asserted in depositions.98 Although Plaintiffs claimed 
that they merely had supplemented and clarified their prior 
discovery with the new affidavits,99 the new information 
had substantive legal meaning for both sides. The 
"supplementation" included an affidavit from Plaintiffs' 
medical expert in which, based upon the newly-
provided information in the Plaintiffs' affidavits, the 
expert opined that the length of time Terran either 
resided at or visited Atlantic's property was sufficient 
to constitute a "substantial factor" in causing his 
injuries. 
According to the court of appeals' analysis, neither 
the rule governing scheduling orders nor the scheduling 
order for a specific case deprives the non-moving party 
of the right to submit an affidavit in opposition to a motion 
for summary judgment. 100 Therefore, a trial court's 
authority to strike affidavits that contradict prior deposition 
testimony must be found in Rule 2-501. 101 Based upon 
this analysis, the court relied upon the traditional rule that 
prohibits trial courts from making credibility determinations 
in ruling on motions for summary judgment. 
However, the court's analysis does not explore in 
detail the potential for conflict arising from the intetplay of 
the summary judgment rule and the rule governing 
scheduling orders as they are applied together. Rule 2-
504 mandates the issuance of a scheduling order in every 
100 /d. at 534, 754 A.2d at 1041. The Court observed that "Rule 
2-504's sequencing contemplates that the facts will be 
developed during discovery and that, based on that discovery 
record, the court will be able to determine whether a trial is 
necessary if a party seeks summary judgment." !d. 
101 /d. With this premise in mind, the Court held that the 
affidavits should not have been stricken because the trial 
court's action in striking them necessarily involved a credibility 
determination. 
102 Rule2-504. 
civil action and sets forth the required format of each 
order. Practically speaking, this scheduling order is 
the roadmap of the litigation. Under Rule 2-504, the 
required contents of each order include assignment to 
the appropriate scheduling category of a differentiated 
case management system, as well as deadlines for 
identification of experts, notification of computer-
generated evidence, completion of discovery, and filing 
of dispositive motions. 
The language ofRule 2-504 expressly requires that 
the scheduling order circumscribe the discovery period, 102 
underscoring the indispensable role that discovery plays 
in civillitigation. 103 Without reference to the discovery 
deadline imposed by Rule 2-504, Rule 2-501 (b) 
authorizes the filing of an affidavit in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment where the motion is 
supported by affidavit or other statement under oath. 
The Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules 
of Practice and Procedure ("the Rules Committee") 
enacted all of the rules at issue here: the summary 
judgment rule, the discovery rules, and the scheduling 
order rule. The Rules Committee, like a legislature, is 
presumed to know the law, including what rules it has 
enacted. Nevertheless, when it enacted Rule 2-504, it 
chose not to modify Rule 2-501 (b). For this reason, it 
could be argued that the Committee intended to 
preserve a party's right to submit new information in 
opposition to summary judgment, even after the close 
of discovery. 
However, in construing court rules, the court reads 
the rules so as to harmonize them and to avoid an 
103 This role of the discovery rules was described by the Court 
of Appeals in Baltimore Transit Co. v. Mezzanotti, 227 Md. 8, 
174 A.2d 768 (1961): "One of their fundamental and principal 
objectives is to require disclosure of facts by a party litigant to 
all of his adversaries, and thereby to eliminate, as far as 
possible, the necessity of any party to litigation going to trial in 
a confused or muddled state of mind, concerning the facts that 
gave rise to the litigation. (Emphasis in original). /d. at 13, 174 
A.2dat771. 
104 SeeCurranv.Price,334Md.149, 172,638A.2d93, 105 
(1994). 
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unintended or unreasonable result. 104 From the 
language of Rule 1-201 (a), it is apparent that the Rules 
Committee intended to create a system of judicial 
administration that would promote procedural 
simplicity and fairness in administration, and that 
would eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay. The 
scheduling order is an essential element of this system. 
Certainly creation and implementation of the 
scheduling order, including resolution of discovery 
disputes, occupies a major portion of a court's 
personnel and financial resources. Thus, the filing of 
post-discovery affidavits such as were filed in Pittman, 
that contradict information provided during the 
discovery phase, severely limits the utility of the 
scheduling order and discovery process. Such filing 
undercuts the court's efforts to generate an appropriate 
scheduling order. It wastes the time of judges hearing 
motions on discovery disputes. It wastes the time of 
counsel who, believing that all of the requested material 
facts have been disclosed, are surprised in the summary 
judgment phase to learn that they have not. Without a 
change in the rules, a party may simply wait until 
discovery closes and the opposing party moves for 
summary judgment to "supplement or clarify" the facts 
or to take seriously the obligation to furnish accurate 
and full information. 
There may be times when the ability to file a post-
deposition affidavit may be necessary. For example, a 
party may discover new evidence, or may have been under 
a disability at the time of first deposition. Nevertheless, 
such circumstances warrant some justification for deviating 
from the scheduling order's deadline for completing and 
supplementing discovery. 
The Pittman Court outlines three measures "for 
dealing with that which the court is convinced is a sham 
affidavit."105 These include sanctions under Rule 1-341, 
but also include prosecution forpeijury. Third among these, 
by authority of the "catchall" power of court under Rule 
105 359 Md. at542, 754A.2dat 1045. 
106 !d. at543, 754A.2dat 1046. 
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2-504(b )(2)(G), the court "could sever the issue of 
material fact involved in the contradictory statements 
for trial as a separate issue, thus presumably sparing 
the moving party the expense of a full trial. 106 
Unfortunately these measures are neither swift nor 
certain. Moreover, they further occupy the very time 
and resources that summary judgment was intended 
to preserve. 
In these circumstances, discovery sanctions are not 
efficacious because the court-ordered discovery phase has 
closed. Time-consuming peijury prosecutions rely for their 
success on the abilities of the local prosecutor to prove 
the peijury beyond a reasonable doubt. Are these truly 
meaningful remedies for a party who relied in good faith 
upon the accuracy, and the truthfulness, of the other party's 
discovery responses? Ultimately, the necessity of enduring 
the full course of the litigation may be so expensive 
that a later-imposed sanction may not be a sufficient 
remedy. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Pittman was litigated pursuant to a scheduling order 
that, in accordance with Rule 2-504, established precisely 
the dates by which certain milestones, including completion 
of all discovery, were to be reached. The conduct that 
sparked the controversy leading to appeal was the 
Plaintiffs' post-deposition affidavits, transforming their 
claim from one that would most likely have been defeated 
on summary judgment into one that, ultimately, has survived 
to be presented to jury. 
In determining whether there exists a genuine dispute 
of material fact, trial courts often are faced with such 
contradictory assertions made, without explanation, after 
the close of discovery. Unless they meet the test set by 
the court in Pittman - that a rational jury would reject 
them as incredible -the moving party is forced to trial. 
This is because there is no requirement to explain why 
newly disclosed information was not disclosed earlier and, 
otherwise, there is no authority for a trial court to evaluate 
whether the assertions contained in an affidavit can be 
viewed as "genuine." The interplay of Rules 2-401, 2-
501(b) and 2-504 presents a dilemma of breadth and 
complexity that deserves thorough consideration by the 
Rules Committee. 
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